

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

14 February 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED REVISION OF NIE-10: COMMUNIST CHINA

14 (e). Each of the measures outlined in (a), (b), (c), and (d) above could be applied with varying degrees of intensity. If they were all applied simultaneously and at the highest level of intensity that the US could directly and indirectly support they would imperil the stability of the Chinese Communist regime.

15. Neither the Chinese people nor the Chinese Communist regime could be expected to remain passive after the initiation of such counter measures. These measures would undoubtedly be portrayed as proof of Kuomintang and US "imperialism and aggression". Those involving direct military action would be regarded as marking a transition from localized to general war on US initiative. General and open Chinese attack on all Western interests would therefore have to be expected. Not only would Chinese Communist ties with the USSR and Chinese Communist dependence on the USSR be strengthened, but the USSR would probably furnish increased

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economic aid and possibly would provide open military assistance. If the USSR did not take such US counteraction as the occasion for beginning a global conflict, the USSR would support Communist China to the extent necessary to get the US deeply involved in Asia, and at the same time exploit the fact of US involvement and Western fears of global war to play upon neutralist and defeatist sentiment in the Near East and Western Europe, and thereby divide the US from its allies.

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A D D I T I O N S

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